The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 63

Number 1

Article 10

February 1996

The Sacredness of Life: An Overview of the Beginning
William E. May

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq

Recommended Citation
May, William E. (1996) "The Sacredness of Life: An Overview of the Beginning," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol.
63: No. 1, Article 10.
Available at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol63/iss1/10

The Sacredness of Life:
An Overview of the Beginning
by
William E. May

The author is Michael1. McGivney Professor of Moral Theology, John Paul II
Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family Washington, D. C. The following
paper was presented at the 64th A nnual Meeting, National Federation ofCatholic
Physicians' Guilds, New York City, November 3, 1995.
To reflect on the sacredness of human life, especially in its beginning, is
particularly appropriate this year, because on March 25 Pope John Paul II
promulgated The Gospel of Life (Evangelium vitae), an encyclical letter
"addressed to the bishops, priests and deacons, men and women religious, lay
faithful, and all people of good will on the value and inviolability of human life."
This encyclical can be described as an impassioned and eminently reasonable
appeal to every person of good will to recognize the dignity, indeed sanctity, of
human life from its inception, to defend it from the vicious and at times subtle
attacks launched against it today, to repudiate the "culture of death" that nurtures
these attacks, to love human life as God's precious gift and to protect and cherish
it by accepting God's invitation to develop a true "culture oflife" or "civilization
of love."
Here I propose to begin with some brief considerations of the reasons why
human life must always be treated with reverence and why human bodily life is a
good intrinsic to human persons and not merely instrumental to them. I will then
consider in more depth why it is reasonable to hold that human persons begin at
fertilization and why it is unreasonable to deny this. 1
Human Life Must Always Be Treated with Reverence

Prescinding from divine revelation - which not only corroborates truths that
can be known without its help but also makes known truths that totally surpass
human understanding - we can conclude that human beings, although truly
animals, are animals radically different in kind and not merely in degree from
other animals. They are so because they can do things that other animals cannot
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do at all, in particular, discriminate between true and false propositions and
determine their lives, their being, through their own free choices, and in order to
do these things it is necessary to infer that there is something in their entitative
make-up - something nonmaterial- utterly lacking to other kinds of animals.
Thus membership in the human species is of crucial moral significance, and
human beings, who are rightly regarded as persons, are beings of moral worth. I
will not pursue this matter further here.1
Divine revelation confirms this truth of human reasoning and deepens it. In his
recent Encyclical Pope John Paul II has eloquently reaffirmed this core belief of
the Church. Human life, he writes, is surpassingly good because "the life which
God gives man is quite different from the life of all other living creatures,
inasmuch as man, although formed from the dust of the earth (cf. Gen. 2:7, 3: 19;
Job 34:15; Ps 103:14; Ps 104:29), isa manifestation of God in the world, a sign of
his presence, a trace of his glory (cf. Gen 1:26-27; Ps 8:6)" (n. 34). Human life,
the pope continues, is the" 'place' where God manifests himself, where we meet
him and enter into communion with him" (n. 38). We can say, in truth, that
human beings, human persons, are the icons of the living, Triune, all-holy God.
This great truth, moreover, is immeasurably deepened and enriched by the
incarnation of God's only-begotten Son, his uncreated Word, who, for love of us,
became, like us, God's "created word." This is the sublime truth about human
persons that Jesus has made known to us. He has made known to us not only who
we are - God's created "words" - but also who we are meant to be! As John
Paul II reminds us, "Eternal life ... is the life of God himself," but it is "at the
very same time the life of the children of God (cf. 1 In. 3:1-2) .... Here the
Christian truth about [human] life becomes most sublime. The dignity of this life
is linked not only to its beginning, to the fact that it comes from God, but also to
its final end, to its destiny of fellowship with God in knowledge and love of him"
(n.38).
In short, human life is sacred because of its relationship with God.
Moreover, and this of crucial importance, human bodily life is a good intrinsic
to human persons. It is part of their very reality and not something extrinsic and
valuable only as an instrumental good, as a means to other human goods. When
God created man he did not create a "conscious subject" to whom he then added
a body as an afterthought. Rather, when he created man, he created "living flesh"
(cf. Gen 2:7); and when his only-begotten Son became man he became "flesh"
(sarx egeneto; J n. 1: 14). In other words, the human person is neither the body nor
the soul taken separately, but a unity of these coprinciples. John paul II
emphasizes this unity in an important text:
All human life - from the moment of conception and through all subsequent stages-is
sacred, because human life is created in the image and likeness of God. Nothing surpasses
the greatness or dignity of a human person. Human life is not just an idea or an
abstraction; human life is the concrete reality of a being that lives, that acts, that grows
and develops; human life is the concrete reality of a being that is capable of love, and of
service to humanity.3

This truth - that human bodily life is a good of the person, intrinsic to the
person, and not a good for the person and instrumental to the person's good - is
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supremely important. Today's "culture of death" proposes a pseudo-personalism
quite dualistic in nature. It identifies personhood with consciousness, regarding
"persons" as conscious subjects aware of themselves as selves and actually
capable of relating meaningfully to other conscious subjects; and it considers the
human body and bodily life as goods instrumental to the "conscious subject," of
value only because they serve conscious awareness. On this view unborn human
beings - and newborn ones as well- are indeed human beings, but they are not
persons because they are not consciously aware of themselves as selves nor
actually capable, at this stage of their lives, of being so aware. This position,
however, is false because it severs the unity of the human person. It is the same
subject who lives and feels and senses who is consciously aware of self. Moreover,
if one man viciously punches another man in the jaw, breaking it, he has by no
means simply damaged his "instrument," he has attacked him as a person.

It Is Reasonable to Hold That Human Persons Begin at Ferti1ization
Vatican Council II, which emphasized that God has entrusted to human
persons the responsibility of reverencing human life, affirmed that "from the
moment of conception life must be guarded with the greatest care, while abortion
and infanticide are unspeakable crimes" (Gaudium et spes, 51). In its 1974
Declaration on Procured Abortion the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
noted that Vatican Council II's teaching simply reaffirmed unbroken Christian
tradition: "The tradition of the Church has always held that human life must be
protected and cherished from the beginning, just as the various stages of its
development."4 Consequently, John Paul II is not saying anything new in
affirming this truth, not only in Evangelium vitae but in numerous other
documents.
Here I will consider various views contending that personal life does not begin
at conception/fertilization. I will begin with opinions that are easily falsified
because, despite their acceptance by many in our society today, they are utterly
incompatible with what we know about human procreation. I will then take up
positions that at least seem more plausible. The falsification of the even more
plausible views will help corroborate the claim that it is reasonable to hold that
human personal life begins at fertilization.

1. Claims easily falsified
These claims deny personhood to the being generated at conception by
denying that it is even a human being and, a fortiori, cannot possibly be
considered aperson. Claims of this sort range from the view, expressed by Philip
Wylie, that the being brought into existence at fertilization is "protoplasmic
rubbish" or a "gobbet of meat," Sto the assertions that it is merely a "blueprint"6
or simply "gametic materials" or the "product of conception,"7 or only a "part of
the mother's body."8 These claims, which rely on rhetoric and the abuse of
language, are patently false to anyone with even the most rudimentary
knowledge of human development and simply should not be taken seriously.
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Another common argument or rather set of arguments against the personh<XXl
of the human zygote and early human embryo is that these organisms do not
"appear" to be persons. Pictures or drawings of human beings at these stages of
development seem to support claims of this kind. As Germain Grisez notes,
arguments of this kind "are persuasive because they use imagery and directly
affect feelings. Usually, in judging whether or not to apply a predicate [such as
person] to an experienced entity, one does not examine it to see whether it meets a
set of intelligible criteria; instead, one judges by appearances, using as guide past
experience of individuals of that kind.''9 However, as Grisez continues, such
arguments can be falsified by pointing out "that, while the particular difference
[between a human zygote or early human embryo and embryos at a later stage of
attention] is striking because of the normal limits of human experience, entities
that are different in that way certainly are living, human individuals." Similarly,
an individual who had never had experience of snow or ice might, on the basis of
. appearances alone, fail to recognize them as forms of water.lO

2. More plausible claims
More plausible claims, clearly and exhaustively identified by Grisez, II are the
following: (I) personh<XXl is a status conferred on some entities by others; (II)
personh<XXl is an attribute acquired by development; (III) personh<XXl requires
self-awareness I2; (IV) personh<XXl is dependent on the development of sense
organs and the brain; (V) personal individuals are formed only two weeks after
fertilization.
The first of these claims (I), namely, that personh<XXl is a status conferred on
some entities by others, is only slightly more plausible than those already
considered. It is, nonetheless, widely current today. Advocates of this position
argue that, since persons exist only with other persons and that societal
recognition of one's personh<XXl entails respect for a person's essential dignity,
it therefore follows that personh<XXl is a social status and that an entity is a person
only when recognized by others as persons. 13
This position, of course, leads to the absurdity that the same entity can be
considered a "person" if one of the parents, for instance, regards it as such and as a
"nonperson" if the other parent esteems it a nonperson. This view presupposes
that human meaning-giving constitutes persons; the truth is that human meaninggiving and human societies presuppose human persons. 14
The second claim (II), that personh<XXl is an attribute acquired by
development, is very common today and is closely related to the third claim (III),
namely, that personh<XXl requires self-awareness. Those holding it, like Michael
Tooley and Daniel Callahan, IS basically maintain that membership in the human
species is not a sufficient criterion for personh<XXl because only some members of
the human species acquire the properties - or at least one necessary property
-for an entity to be considered a "person." The strategy of advocates of this
position is to stipulate that an entity can only be regarded as a person if it is aware
of its own interests and/or rights and be concerned about them. On this view not
only are unborn children not persons but so too are newborns and, apparently,
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adult humans who are no longer able to exercise their cognitive faculties to the point
that they are aware of their own interests, etc.
This fallacious argument fails to distinguish between a radical capacity and a
developed capacity. An unborn and/or newborn child, precisely by reason of its
membership in the human species, has the radical capacity, rooted in its being, to
discriminate between true and false proposition and to make free choices. But in
order for the child actually to engage in these activities his radical capacity to do so
needs to be developed. But it can never be developed if it is not there to begin with.
Similarly, adult humans, because of accidents, may no longer be able actually to
engage in such activities, not because they no longer have the natural or radical
capacity to do so, but simply because they cannot exercise these powers of the
human person as a result of accident or illness. Similarly, members of the species of
eagles have the radical capacity to soar loftily in the air, but eaglets have not as yet
developed their capacity to do so, and an eagle whose wing has been broken is no
longer able actually to exercise its capacity to fly because the exercise thereof has
been inhibited.
Moreover, as Grisez observes, this flawed notion of personhood, and the previous
one as well, "miss what person means in ordinary language," where the word refers
to a living, human individual. 16 The legitimate application of this term
to non-adult human beings is rooted in its use in referring to adult human beings,
who regularly think of their personhood not as a trait they have acquired at some
time in their lives but as an aspect of their very being. If one asks a person when he or
she was born, he or she will spontaneously say that he or she was born on his or her
day of birth, clearly implying that the person so responding considers himself or
herself to be identical in being with the one born on that day. And were one to ask a
person, "when were you conceived?" the person addressed would spontaneously
reply "approximately nine months before I was born," thereby implying that he or
she regards himself or herself as the very same being, i.e., person, conceived and
bornP
The third claim (III), namely, that personhood requires self-consciousness, is also
widely held in society today. This claim, of course, is rooted in a dualistic
conception of human beings, and was in part shown to be philosophically unsound
earlier in this paper. It is true, of course,that human persons can do things - think,
make free choices, etc. - which show that they are more than their bodies and that
they are also (or can be) conscious subjects aware of themselves as selves and
capable of relating to other selves. But those who, like Michael Tooley, Joseph
Fletcher, and many of our contemporaries,18 rely on truths like this to support their
contention that although abortion destroys a living human body it does not kill a
person because the person is a conscious subject aware of itself as a self whose body
is not integral to his being qua person but is rather a good for the person, good, that
is, as a condition for such personal goods as consciousness, self-consciousness,
conscious awareness of other persons, etc., are simply jumping to unwarranted
conclusions.
This dualistic position is untenable. As Grisez notes, "persons can be more than
their bodies without being realities other than their bodies, since a whole can be
more than one of its parts without being a reality other than that part."19 The human
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person, as we have already emphasized, is a unitary being; there is not one being
who breathes, eats, sleeps, feels bodily pain, etc., and another being who thinks,
chooses, and is aware of his rights, etc. The same human being, the same person,
is the living human body and the subject of activities requiring more than bodily
capacities.
The fourth claim (IV), namely, that personhood is dependent on sense organs
and a brain, is also widespread today. Unlike the previous position, it repudiates a
dualistic understanding of the human person; nonetheless its advocates assert that
the early human embryo cannot be regarded as a person insofar as it lacks sense
organs and a brain, material organs necessary for exercising human cognitive and
volitional powers.
Among advocates of this view are several Roman Catholic theologians, for
instance, Joseph Donceel, S.J., and Thomas A. Shannon and Allan Wolter,
O.F.M., who seek to rehabilitate for modern times the "delayed hominization"
theory of St. Thomas Aquinas. 20 According to this view, the human embryo
undergoes a substantial change from a subhuman entity to a human, personal
entity, and does so when its body becomes sufficiently organized to be fit matter
for the infusion of a spiritual soul. Their claim is that the subhuman body
becomes so organized with the development of sense organs and the brain (surely
when the neocortex is present and perhaps earlier). Their claim is that it is at this
point that the entity in question undergoes a substantial change from being a
non personal entity to becoming a personal entity, realizing that it is absurd to
suggest that babies undergo a substantial change after birth even though they
cannot actually engage in thought until some time later in their development.
They thus hold that the brain's development is not itself the bodily basis for
intellectual activities but only its precursor, but that this is all that the
hylemorphic theory of St. Thomas requires.
Responding to this claim, Grisez simply notes the following: "if this precursor
[the rudimentary brain] satisfies the requirements of the hylemorphic theory,
there is no reason why earlier precursors should fail to satisfy it. But each
embryonic individual has from the outset its specific developmental tendency,
which includes the epigenetic primordia of all its organs. Therefore, the
hylemorphic theory does not preclude a human zygote's having a personal
soul."21
The "delayed hominization" theory championed by these authors has been
effectively challenged by many others, including, in addition to Grisez, Benedict
Ashley and Jean de Siebenthal.22
SiebenthaI's refutation of this view is most interesting, in my opinion,
inasmuch as he roots it in the thought of St. Thomas himself, to whom these
authors appeal for support. Siebenthai first stresses that for St. Thomas the origin
of the human body coincides with the infusion of an intellectual soul. For St.
Thomas human flesh gets its being from the human, intellectual SOUP3 Since St.
Thomas himself thought, erroneously (relying on the allegedly biological
evidence of his day), that in human generation the male seed was alone the active
element, he concluded that the body first formed from the maternal blood by this
seed was only vegetative in nature; later, a substantial change occurred and a new
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body, this time animated by an animal soul, was formed; finally, another substantial
change occurred and a new body, human in nature and animated by a spiritual soul,
came into being. But note that for S1. Thomas the bodies first generated were
nonhuman in nature. Thus he concluded that there was a radical discontinuity
between the bodies formed during gestation. Siebenthal's point is that St. Thomas,
were he alive today and aware of the biological evidence known today, would not
hesitate in concluding that the body that comes to be when fertilization is completed
is indubitably a human body and hence that its organizing and vivifying principle
can only be a human sou~ an intellectual soul.24
In addition to those championing an allegedly updated hominization theory,
others today affirm that since a person can be declared dead if the total and
irreversible cessation of the functions of the whole brain has been definitively
established, then one can also say that a person does not come into being until the
brain develops.25
This interpretation of the data, as Grisez clearly shows, is false. Obviously, when
the whole brain is dead, there is nothing remaining that can integrate the activities of
the organism; however, before the brain is developed in the living, human organism,
there is something in that organism during its zygotic and early embryonic stages
that certainly integrates all its living activities so that one cannot declare that the
organism is dead nor deny that it is identifiably a member of the human species as
distinct from other animal species.26
The fifth claim (V), namely, that personal individuals are formed only two weeks
after fertilization, is a claim that seeks support in the phenomenon of identical
twinning (and, possibly, of recombination). Many today champion this view. It has
been most extensively elaborated by Norbert M. Ford, S.D.B., in his highly
influential book When Did I Begin? Conception ofthe Human Individual in History,
Philosophy, and Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). This
claim has, however, been subjected to devastating critique, in my opinion, by
several competent scholars, among them Anthony Fisher, O.P., Nicholas TontiFilippini, Benedict Ashley, O.P. and Albert Moraczewski, O.P., and Grisez. 27
Basically, this view holds that in the early embryo (or pre-embryo, as some
want to call the entity in question) prior to implantation, the various cells within
the zona pellucida are all totipotential, i.e., each can become distinct individual
human beings, all with the same genetic makeup. The thesis, as articulated
particularly by Ford, is that the zygote/early embryo is genetically and
biologically human and distinct from its parents but that it is not yet an
ontologically distinct human individual or person. Rather it is a colony of
individual cells each capable of developing into a distinct human individual
because it is possible that identical twins (or triplets or . . . ) may develop from this
mass of cells prior to implantation.
However, as scientific authorities such as R. Yanagimachi note in
summarizing what is known about mammalian fertilization, "fertilization in
mammals normally represents the beginning of life for an individual."28 Citing
this text, Grisez points out that the evidence available does not support Ford's
thesis that cell division in the early embryo "gives rise to really distinct individuals
until a small army of them form the true human individual." Ford tries to lend his
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claim some plausibilty by stressing that groups of individuals can function as a
whole toward a common end and that, therefore, the colony of genetically
identical but ontologically distinct cells assembled in the preimplantation embryo
can do so too. But, as Grisez notes, Ford simply ignores a fact about a group of
individuals which prevents us from considering the group as a single individual,
namely, the fact that they do not even form a physical whole. But, as everyone
knows, the developing embryo is a physical whole, undivided in itself.29
The crucial question raised by such phenomena as identical twinning and so
on is this: Do they, of themselves, demonstrate that the "ontological" human
individual comes into being only at implantation? The effort of Ford and others
to show that this is the case is very weak and presupposes that the individual cells
contained within the zona pellucida have an active potentiality to become distinct
ontological individuals. But if they had this active potentiality, then they would
all become such, and even Ford does not suggest this. Thus, "contrary to what
Ford asserts (without argument), in those zygotes which develop continuously as
individuals, the facts do not evidence an active potentiality to develop otherwise.
Rather, at most the facts show that all early embryos could passively undergos
division or recombination."30
In other words, the argument that human persons do not begin at fertilization
and alleges that such phenomena as twinning and recombination
show that this is so, is ultimately one based on appearances and alleged common
sense, but it fails to prove what it claims to prove. It is far more likely, as Ashley
and Moraczewski argue in a painstaking study, that identical twinning is a
developmental accident and that the coming into being of identical twins can be
reasonably explained by asexual reproduction.31
Twinning in no way compels the conclusion that, normally, there is not in
being from fertilization a distinct human individual. It is possible that some
human individuals come to be after fertilization and prior to implantation, but
their mode of coming to be is an accident and does not refute the claim, solidly
based on contemporary scientific evidence, that a distinctly new, living, human
body comes to be at fertilization. Since the entity in question is a human body
because it is informed and vivified by a human soul, it possesses a human nature,
the nature of a person made in the image and likeness of God. It is thus reasonable
to hold that it is indeed a human person, a being of transcendent and inviolable
dignity, indeed of sanctity.
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